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ABSTRACT 
The interconnected relationship between international human 
rights law and international criminal law has long been an issue of 
scholarship. This article examines the last decade of practice at the 
International Criminal Court focusing on instances where the Court 
has either invoked a human rights interpretation of governing 
documents or rejected such an approach. The article concludes that 
the application of human rights is unclear and is largely driven by 
pragmatism rather than principle. Greater clarity, through a more 
consistent and transparent theory of international criminal law 
interpretation, is needed. In the meantime, the judges should remain 
reluctant from too easily conflating the two fields of law because to 
do so, at the expense of an accused, can undermine the very 
principles upon which fair and legitimate criminal proceedings 
operate. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The development of international human rights law and the 
development of international criminal law were both, to a great 
extent, inspired by a desire to ensure that the acts that took place 
under Nazi Germany could never happen again, or if they did happen, 
a system would be in place to address them.1 As such, both fields of 
law largely share a considerable common base.2 Where human rights 
obligations are directed towards State responsibility, international 
criminal courts focus on individual criminal responsibility for specific 
violations of international law. Although the international human 
rights framework developed at a faster pace following the Second 
World War, from the 1990s onwards the field of international 
criminal law has grown significantly. Indeed, the international 
community created modern international criminal tribunals, including 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) 
and the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), amongst others,3 to 
address serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law. 
Likewise, human rights bodies, such as regional human rights courts 
in Africa, the Americas and Europe, continue to address issues 
relating to international crimes and the responsibility of States. The 
                                                          
1. ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 13 (3d ed. 2014). 
2. Id. See also William A. Schabas, Criminal Responsibility for Violations of Human 
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, MONITORING, ENFORCEMENT 281 
(Janusz Symonides ed., Aldershot 2003). 
3. Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”), Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (“ECCC”) and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”) are other examples. 
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two fields are therefore historically and presently linked. Indeed, 
when looking at the jurisprudence of the international criminal 
tribunals, it is clear that both the ICTY and ICTR have used human 
rights law to assist in interpreting substantive law and procedure.4 It 
was therefore welcomed when the Rome Statute of the ICC included 
a reference to “internationally recognized human rights” within its 
Article 21(3) concerning the applicable law the judges should apply.5 
This provision seemed to reinforce the interconnected relationship 
between international criminal law and international human rights 
law. 
Despite the numerous areas of overlap between international 
criminal law and international human rights law, it is nonetheless 
important to remember that the two fields are not the same and should 
not be treated as such.6 Not all human rights violations will constitute 
crimes under international criminal law. Moreover, obligations under 
international human rights law are directed at States, not individuals. 
And, most importantly, where human rights norms and standards may 
be interpreted expansively in order to achieve their stated goals of 
broad protection, the principle of legality and the rights of an accused 
in a criminal process largely dictate that criminal law be strictly 
interpreted and in cases of ambiguity resolved in favour of an 
accused. Furthermore, while the ICC certainly deals with serious 
violations of human rights and human rights norms are listed as a 
secondary source of applicable law under the Statute,7 the Court was 
never designed to operate as a human rights institution but rather as a 
                                                          
4.  Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, Judgment, ¶ 467 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001); Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-
95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 608-15 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000); 
Prosecutor v. Dokmanovic, Case No. IT-95-13a-PT, Decision on the Motion for Release 
Decision by the Accused Slavo Dokmanović, ¶ 59-60 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 22, 1997); Prosecutor v. Nahimana, No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, ¶ 983-
1010 (Dec. 3, 2003); Prosecutor v. Bikindi, No. ICTR-01-72, Judgment, ¶ 378-97 (Dec. 2, 
2008); see also Cryer, supra note 1, at 10.  
5. See, e.g., Mary Robinson, High Commissioner for Human Rights welcomes Sixtieth 
Ratification of Statute of International Criminal Court. United Nations Press Release, (April 
11, 2002), http://www.un.org/press/en/2002/HR4583.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/SXC3-PCHY] 
(archived Feb. 27, 2018).  
6. See Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, 21 Leiden J. 
of Int’l L. 925 (2008); Markus Benzing, The Complementarity Regime of the International 
Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the Fight against 
Impunity, 7 Max Planck Y.B. of United Nations L. 591 (2003).  
7. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 21, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90.   
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criminal court.8 This distinction is important and begs the questions: 
to what extent has the ICC adopted an overtly human rights approach 
to interpretation of its substantive and procedural provisions and does 
it do so in a clear and principled manner? 
Yet despite this important distinction, there has been a real fear 
by those working within international criminal law that international 
criminal institutions have been adopting “contradictory assumptions 
and methods of reasoning” from criminal law and international 
human rights law.9 This amalgamation has manifested in internal 
contradictions and potentially unfair practices.10 After briefly 
outlining the important distinctions between international human 
rights law and international criminal law, this Article will delve into a 
number of prominent instances where a human rights-based approach 
to interpretation was either embraced or rejected by the Court. This 
Article first highlights two examples in which ICC judges accord 
human rights norms precedent over restraining principles of criminal 
law, to the detriment of an accused. The examples were selected 
because of their importance both substantively and procedurally. This 
Article will go on to show that the picture is a complex one. Indeed, it 
demonstrates that many of the ICC judges seem to be aware that the 
Court cannot address all human rights issues, even if tangentially 
related to a case before it. Explaining this view, this Article highlights 
three prominent instances in which the Court has recognized a clear 
distinction between its responsibilities and those of a human rights 
body. 
Drawing on these examples, the article shows that while the 
Court rightly promotes human rights norms and standards, thus far, it 
has, to a large extent, been reluctant to take on a broader human rights 
mandate, at least when not directly related to the criminal process 
against an accused. Overall, it is difficult to determine a clear pattern 
                                                          
8. For instance, the Appeals Chamber has taken note of the fact that during the drafting 
of the Statute “many delegations believed that procedural fairness should not be a ground for 
the purpose of defining complementarity.” See Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Case No. 
ICC-01/11-01/11-565, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Abdullah Al-Senussi against the 
Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 October 2013 Entitled “Decision on the Admissibility 
of the Case against Abdullah Al-Senussi, ¶ 495 (July 24, 2014).  
9. See Robinson, supra note 6, at 925; See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights and 
International Criminal Law, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
11 (W.A. Schabas ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2016); see also Masha Fedorova & Göran 
Sluiter, Human Rights as Minimum Standards in International Criminal Proceedings, 3 HUM. 
RTS. AND INT’L LEGAL DISCOURSE 9 (2009).  
10. See generally Robinson, supra note 6 . 
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when the Court embraces human rights norms over restraining 
principles of criminal law. It has done so rather inconsistently, though 
some pragmatic and contextual explanations can be discerned from its 
reasoning. This Article argues that in order to reaffirm its liberal 
criminal justice approach, it should continue to avoid taking on a 
broader human rights mandate, particularly when to the detriment of 
the accused, if it wishes to avoid what Robinson coined as an 
“identity crisis” in the years to come. 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND BODIES 
From the Second World War onwards, there has been a 
proliferation of international human rights instruments and bodies 
established for the protection human rights. Of the nine core 
international human rights treaties, there are ten 
mechanisms/committees set up to monitor human rights protection at 
the domestic level.11 In addition to the international human rights 
treaty body regime, regional human rights bodies, most notably the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American 
Court on Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights provide another crucial layer of 
protection for individual human rights. 
Almost all of the respective human rights mechanisms 
(excluding the Charter-based system which is not discussed in this 
Article) adopt a distinct approach to legal interpretation characteristic 
of human rights bodies. Using the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
                                                          
11. The nine core international human rights treaties and their corresponding treaty 
bodies include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the 
Human Rights Committee (“HRC”), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (“ICESCR”) and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”), 
International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”) and the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”), Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”) and the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (“CtDAW”), the Convention against Torture 
(“CAT”) and the Committee against Torture (“CtAT”) as well as the Subcommittee on the 
Prevention against Torture (“SPT”), The Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) and 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child (“CtRC”), Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers (“CPRMW”) and the Committee on Migrant Workers 
(“CMW”), Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
(“CPED”) and the Committee on Enforced Disappearances (“CED”), and Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“CRPD”) and the Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (“CtRPD”). 
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Treaties,12 and the interpretative methods provided under their 
respective treaties, judges and commissioners operating within human 
rights courts or bodies have developed a number of overarching 
approaches to interpretation.13 First, human rights bodies 
acknowledge the primacy of the texts of human rights treaties.14 
Second, they often favour a teleological approach whereby they focus 
on the object and purpose of the treaty, which in the case of human 
rights is usually geared towards the protection of the rights of an 
individual vis-à-vis a State.15 As such, they have a tendency to 
interpret rights in an expansive and progressive manner.16 Indeed, 
there are many instances in which human rights bodies have expressly 
welcomed “liberal,” “broad,” “progressive,” and “dynamic” 
interpretations of the law.17 As noted by the former President of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Cecilia Medina, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights “does not see itself only as a 
guardian of the individual interests of one victim, but as the custodian 
                                                          
12. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S 331. 
13. D.L. SHELTON, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW 110 (Edward Elgar ed., 2014); see also K. Mechlem, Treaty Bodies and the 
Interpretation of Human Rights, 42 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 905 (2009). 
14. See Shelton, supra note 13, at 110.  
15.  Id. However, not all human rights bodies adopt a progressive interpretation approach 
all the time. Many of the human rights bodies defer to less progressive methods on sensitive 
issues. See e.g.,Hatton v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36022/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 122 (2003) 
(deferring to the margin of appreciation in the case of environmental human rights).  
16. Shelton, supra note 13, at 110. 
17. Robinson, supra note 6, at 933 n.30; HRC, Kim v. Republic of Korea, 
Communication No. 1786/2008, Views 1 February 2013, CCPR/C/106/D/1786/2008, 
Appendix V, ¶ 11 (‘the Committee should maintain its progressive approach’); HRC, A. v. 
Australia, Communication No. 560/1993, Views 3 April 1997, A/52/40 (Vol. II), Annex VI, 
sect. L. (at 125-46) (‘broadly and expansively’). In the Inter-American system, see for 
example, Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of 
Journalism, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 2 (1985), Separate Opinion of 
Judge Rodolfo Piza, ¶ 6, 12 (‘necessity of a broad interpretation of the norms that it guarantees 
and a restrictive interpretation of those that allow them to be limited’); Bámaca Velásquez v. 
Guatemala, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 70 (2000), separate judgement of Judge 
Sergio Garcia Ramirez, ¶ 3 (‘progressive interpretation’, ‘guiding momentum of international 
human rights law, which strives to take the real protection of human rights increasingly 
further’). In the European system, see Report of the Commission, 1 June 1973, ECHR Series 
B, No. 16 at 9 (the Convention is not to be narrowly interpreted having regard to the 
sovereignty of states, but rather given a broad interpretation to protect rights effectively); East 
African Asians v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R.2 (14 December 1973), ¶ 192-5;, Stafford 
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 46295/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 68,  (May 2002). 
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of the public order created by the system.”18 This, she says, reflects 
the true sense of a human rights court. The express acceptance of 
more progressive and dynamic interpretations of law by human rights 
bodies, many of which are composed of human rights experts and not 
necessarily judges, stands in contrast to accepted interpretative 
methods largely associated with criminal law adjudication. 
In the liberal model, because the State is viewed as substantially 
more powerful than any of its citizens, and in order to protect the 
rights of a citizen vis-à-vis the State, limits need to be placed on State 
authority. The need for limits is particularly important in the field of 
criminal law, where States exert the ultimate power over an 
individual, namely the ability to detain or in some cases execute. 
Because the individual being accused may be marginalized and 
unpopular, criminal procedures adhering to strict standards of fair trial 
and due process rights are designed to lessen the imbalance of power 
and overcome stigma or bias against an accused. As such, liberal 
systems “embrace restraints on its pursuit of societal aims out of 
respect for the autonomy of the individuals who may be subject to the 
system.”19 
Liberal criminal justice systems therefore rely on and employ 
restraining principles in order to achieve accuracy and fairness in the 
process. Robinson emphasizes three important liberal criminal justice 
restraining principles that this article will also address: the principle 
of personal culpability, the principle of legality and the principle of 
fair labelling. The principle of personal culpability holds that 
individuals are only accountable for their own conduct. The principle 
requires a certain level of knowledge and intent in relation to the 
prohibited conduct in order to meet the mens rea requirement of 
culpability.20 The principle of legality, or nullum crimen sine lege, 
holds that definitions of crimes not be applied retroactively and be 
strictly applied, so as to provide fair notice to individuals and restrain 
                                                          
18. C. Medina Quiroga, Column, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: 35 Years, 
7 NETH. Q. OF HUM. RTS. 118, 121 (2015). 
19. Robinson, supra note 6, at 926. 
20. See generally id; Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. (Čelebići), Case No. IT-96-21-T, 
Judgement, ¶ 424 (Nov. 16, 1998); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 136-
137 (Paola Gaetana et al. eds., 2003); ICC Rome Statute Arts 30-33 A/CONF/183/9 (16 July 
2002); Gerhard Werle & Florian Jessberger, Unless Otherwise Provided’: Article 30 of the 
ICC Statute and the Mental Element of Crimes under International Criminal Law, 3 J. OF 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 35 (2005); Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, The General Principles of the 
International Criminal Law Set Out in Nuremberg, as Mirrored in the ICC Statute, 2 J. OF 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 38, 44 (2004).  
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any arbitrary abuse of power.21  Finally, the principle of fair labelling 
holds that the label of the offense should fairly and clearly express the 
wrongdoing of the accused so that any conviction corresponds to the 
wrongfulness of the act. In addition to these three important criminal 
law principles that have been recognized by international criminal 
courts, the principles of legal certainty and other fair trial rights are 
also relevant. The principle of legal certainty is closely related to the 
notion of predictability, the principle of legitimate expectation and the 
rule of law.22 The principle of legal certainty refers to the requirement 
that legal rules be sufficiently clear and precise, and that situations 
and legal relationships remain foreseeable.23 Furthermore, there are a 
number of fair trial rights that form the foundation of a liberal, 
restraining system. This Article addresses three, which the author 
views as particularly relevant in the case law of the ICC. These 
include the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence, 
the right to an expeditious trial, and the right to be tried by an 
independent and impartial tribunal.24 
III. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
The ICC is the only permanent international court with 
jurisdiction to prosecute individuals believed to be responsible for the 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the 
crime of aggression.25 It has jurisdiction with respect to these crimes 
after July 1, 2002, when the Rome Statute entered into force, or once 
a State becomes a party to the Statute.26 Presently, 123 States are 
party to the Rome Statute. The Court does not exercise universal 
jurisdiction. Rather, the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the nationals 
or territories of the States Parties, States accepting jurisdiction on an 
ad hoc basis, or when the Security Council acting pursuant to its 
                                                          
21.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 22, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90; Bruce Broomhall, Nullum Crimen Sine Lege, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 447, 450-51 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999). 
22. JUHA RAITIO, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL CERTAINTY IN EC LAW 127 (2003). 
23. Id. at 126. 
24. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, December 16, 1996, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 67, July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.  
25. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90.  
26. Id. art. 11.  
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Chapter VII powers refers a situation to the Court.27 Importantly, the 
principle of complementarity directs the relationship between the 
Court and States Parties. A case will only be admissible before the 
ICC if a State is unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out an 
investigation or prosecution.28 Hence, the Court is designed to 
complement national prosecutions and is intended as a court of last 
resort. 
The Rome Statute explicitly refers to “human rights” three 
times: Articles 21(3), 36(b)(ii) and 69(7). Article 21 refers to 
“Applicable Law” and lays out the law that the Court should apply. 
This includes the Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, as well as, where appropriate, applicable 
treaties and principles of international law, and principles and rules of 
law as interpreted in its previous decisions. Article 21(3) provides 
additional guidance to the judges and requires that the application and 
interpretation of law must be consistent with recognized human rights 
standards. Article 36 concerns the qualifications, nomination and 
election of judges and sub-section 3(b)(ii) requires that every 
candidate have competence in relevant areas of international law such 
as the law of human rights. Article 69(7) provides that evidence 
obtained in violation of internationally recognized human rights, such 
as through torture or other questionable methods, will not be 
admissible if it could seriously damage the integrity of the 
proceedings or such a violation would render it suspiciously 
unreliable. 
Of all three provisions, Article 21(3) is arguably the most 
relevant to this inquiry as it pertains to statutory interpretation and 
sources of law. At the Rome Conference,29 the diplomatic conference 
where the drafting of the Rome Statute took place, there was “virtual 
unanimity” between the various delegations concerning the fact that 
the judges’ interpretation of law would need to be “consistent with 
internationally recognized human rights.”30 McAuliffe de Guzman 
                                                          
27. Id. art. 12-13.  
28. Id. art. 17. The principle of complementarity has proven contentious. See Michael A. 
Newton, The Complementarity Conundrum: Are We Watching Evolution or Evisceration? 8 
SANTA CLARA J. OF INT’L L. 115, 135-36 (2010). 
29. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (June 15-July 17, 1998). 
30. Margaret McAuliffe de Guzman, Article 21: Applicable Law, in COMMENTARY ON 
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, 
ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 701, 711 (Otto Trifferer, ed., 2d ed. 2008).  
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and Arsanjani both hold the view that “although the original intention 
behind Article 21(3) was to limit the discretion of the Court by 
providing a ‘boundary’ within which interpretation and application of 
the law could be undertaken, its actual affect may be to broaden 
judicial competence.”31 Similarly, William Schabas, has described 
Article 21(3) as ensuring that “the Statute is full of promise for 
innovative interpretation in future years.”32 Some commentators view 
it as the most important advancement contained in the Statute,33 and 
others believe that it holds a hierarchical position such that all 
applicable law is subject to internationally recognized human rights.34 
There is ambiguity, however, about whether the provision is intended 
to allow for expansive interpretations, particularly to the detriment of 
an accused. 
Generally, most of the Court’s jurisprudence “reflects the 
significant distinction between regarding it [human rights law] as a 
source of substantive law” versus as a general interpretative rule.35 
The Appeals Chamber has noted that it is an underlying rule of 
interpretation applicable when considering other sources of law and 
further noting that “article 21(3) of the Statute makes the 
interpretation as well as the application of the law applicable under 
                                                          
31. Rebecca Young, Internationally Recognized Human Rights Before the International 
Criminal Court, 60 INT’L AND COMP. Q. 189, 191 (2011) (citing Manoush H. Arsanjani, The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93 Am. J. of Int’l L. 22, 28-29 (1993) and 
McAuliffe de Guzman, supra note 30, at 712). 
32. William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 93 
(Cambridge University, 2d ed. 2004). 
33. THE ADVOCACY PROJECT, ON THE RECORD: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
(July 7, 1998), http://www.advocacynet.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Issue-13-ICC.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F82V-YBCK] (archived Feb. 28, 2018). 
34. Dapo Akande, Sources of International Criminal Law, in THE OXFORD COMPANION 
TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 41, 47 (Oxford University Press 2009); Alain Pellet, 
Applicable Law, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
COMMENTARY VOL. II 1051, 1080-81 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., Oxford University Press 
2002). 
35. Young, supra note 31, at 200. The Pre-Trial Chambers have also viewed Article 
21(3) as being a general principle of interpretation. See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-01/07-257, Decision on the Joinder of the Cases against German Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, at 7 (Mar. 10, 2008); Prosecutor v. German Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-330, Decision on the Powers of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to Review Proprio Motu the Pretrial Detention of German Katanga, at 6 (Mar. 18 
2008); Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07-474, Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights Attached to Procedural Status of Victim 
at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, ¶ 78 (May 15, 2008). 
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the Statute subject to internationally recognized human rights.”36 It 
has further stated that “[h]uman rights underpin the Statute; every 
aspect of it.”37 Article 21(3) can therefore best be characterized as a 
special rule of interpretation which, on occasion, has provided for 
potentially expansive recourse to substantive human rights norms 
accepted by the international community. Keeping this provision in 
mind, the following sections highlight two instances where judges 
have embraced a human rights approach to interpretation. 
A. Human Rights at Play 
There are, at least, two important areas were the ICC judges 
have embraced a human rights-based approach to interpretation, the 
first substantive and the second procedural. The first example has to 
do with a specific decision in the Katanga and Ngudjolo case 
pertaining to Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court.38 In this 
case the Judges decided to re-characterize the facts almost six months 
after the close of trial and after the accused had testified on his own 
behalf, which resulted in a new mode of liability being applied to 
convict the accused.39 The second example relates to a multitude of 
decisions by the Court relating to the procedural rights afforded to 
victims participating in the criminal process.40 
                                                          
36. Situation in the Dem. Rep. Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04-168, Judgment on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chambers I’s 31 March 2006 
Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, ¶ 11 (July 13, 2006). See also Prosecutor v. Lubanga 
Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-772, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant 
to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, ¶ 36 (Dec. 14, 2006). However, other 
Chambers, have treated Article 21(3) as a “gap-filling” mechanism whereby it becomes a 
substantive source of applicable law. Cf. Situation in the Dem. Rep. Congo, Case No. ICC-
01/04-101-tEN-Corr, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of 
VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, ¶ 81 (Jan. 17, 2006), and 
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 
44 (Mar. 4, 2009).  
37. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-772, ¶ 37. 
38. Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA, 
Decision on the Implementation of Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and Severing 
the Charges against the Accused Persons (Nov. 21, 2012).  
39. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3363, Judgment on the Appeal of 
Mr. Germain Katanga against the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 21 November 2012 entitled 
“Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and severing 
the charges against the accused persons,” ¶ 30, 33, 62 and 99 (Mar. 27, 2013). 
40. See Section III.A.2 for specific examples. 
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1. Katanga Case: Re-characterization of the Facts 
In the Katanga and Ngudjolo case, prior to the cases being 
separated, the Prosecutor originally charged Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui with three counts of crimes against humanity 
and seven counts of war crimes allegedly committed during an attack 
on Bogoro, a village in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo 
(“DRC”). Both men were accused under Article 25(3)(a) of having 
committed the crimes through the mode of liability referred to as 
“indirect co-perpetration.” As indirect co-perpetrators, the men 
allegedly used hierarchical organizations, the Ituri Patriotic 
Resistance Force (“FRPI”) and the Nationalist and Integrationist 
Front (“FNI”), to carry out the crimes in accordance with their 
common plan, namely to destroy Bogoro. 
Nearly six months after the close of the trial, a majority of the 
Trial Chamber, acting under Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the 
Court, notified the parties and participants that it would likely change 
Katanga’s mode of liability to “common purpose” liability under 
Article 25(3)(d)(ii). Under Regulation 55, judges may make changes 
to the legal charges or mode of liability alleged against an accused at 
any stage of the trial as long as the change does not exceed the facts 
and circumstances confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. As a result, 
the Judges severed the two cases and acquitted Ngudjolo on 
December 18, 2012. Part of their legal justification for their late 
application of Regulation 55 rested on the fact that the Appeals 
Chamber in the Lubanga case had previously held that “a principal 
purpose of Regulation 55 is to close accountability gaps, a purpose 
that is fully consistent with the Statute.”41 The Trial Chamber then 
went on to cite case law from the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECHR”) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights to justify its 
finding that the rights of the accused were protected despite the late 
application of this regulation and its expansive application.42 
Trial Chamber Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert disagreed 
with the position taken by the majority and argued in a strongly 
worded dissent that the majority had overstepped its position. She 
argued that the majority created a new narrative of the case, which 
                                                          
41. Katanga and Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA, ¶ 12; Katanga, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3363, ¶ 104. 
42. Katanga and Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA, ¶¶ 16-18, 22, 
37, 43, 48.  
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failed to reflect key distinctions made in the confirmation of charges 
and at trial. The new narrative, she argued, presented a 
“fundamentally different case” that the defense must answer.43 She 
also lamented that the majority added “significantly new elements” 
and new factual allegations to what had been confirmed by the Pre-
Trial Chamber,44 and as such, exceeded the facts and circumstances 
of what was included in the confirmation of charges decision. In her 
view, months after the close of trial, Katanga now faced a completely 
new case and the notice provided by the Trial Chamber was not 
enough to protect his fair trial rights. She emphasized that the 
appearance of bias was alarming, noting that:  
[b]y having to formulate what can only be described as new 
charges, the Majority finds itself in the uncomfortable position of 
being accuser and judge at the same time. The fact that judges 
have started these proceedings down a path so unclear that new 
charges had to be formulated at the end of a trial, after all the 
Prosecution’s evidence has been heard, inevitably creates an 
appearance of bias.45 
She pleaded with the majority to refrain from considering any 
changes to the mode of liability against Katanga and to proceed 
immediately to render its final judgment based on the original set of 
facts. Katanga’s defense team appealed the Trial Chamber’s decision 
to re-characterize the facts, but a majority of the Appeals Chamber 
did not find any error.46 However, the Appeals Chamber did note that 
the Trial Chamber’s decision lacked detail about the factual basis for 
the new charges.47 
In its Judgment, the majority of the Trial Chamber did change 
the mode of liability, convicting Katanga under the newly, re-
characterized facts. As a result, Katanga was convicted of crimes on 
the basis of an uncharged and un-litigated mode of liability that the 
Trial Chamber first mentioned more than six months after the end of a 
thirty-month trial. Once again, Judge Van den Wyngaert drafted a 
strongly-worded dissent in which she detailed what she saw as the 
errors committed by the majority and highlighted the fair trial 
                                                          
43. Id. ¶ 11 (Wyngaert, J., dissenting). 
44. Id. ¶ 15 (Wyngaert, J., dissenting). 
45. Id. at ¶ 39. 
46. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3363, ¶ 7 (Tarfusser, J., dissenting). 
Interestingly, in his dissent, Judge Tarfusser references European Court of Human Rights case 
law to show a different reading would put into question the use of Regulation 55 in this case. 
47. Id. at ¶ 102. 
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violations that she saw to have taken place. Kevin John Heller, a 
prominent international criminal law scholar, has referred to Judge 
Van den Wyngaert’s dissent “as the lone bright spot in an otherwise 
dismal case — one that has resulted in perhaps the most unfair 
conviction in the history of international criminal law.”48 
The majority of the Trial Chamber’s interpretative approach in 
determining that Regulation 55 was appropriate rested in part on the 
argument that “a principal purpose of Regulation 55 is to close 
accountability gaps,” which they viewed as fully consistent with the 
Statute.49 They came to this conclusion after briefly examining 
relevant restraining principles of criminal law but choosing instead to 
focus on the very broad notion of the importance of ending impunity 
for crimes.50 While the goal of ending impunity for crimes is certainly 
affirmed in the Preamble to the Rome Statute, it arguably should not 
be achieved at the cost of the liberal criminal justice system, which 
emphasizes fair trial rights and restraining principles of law such as 
legal certainty and legality, which are recognized in Article 67 of the 
Statute. The Trial Chamber addressed issues of the appearance of 
partiality,51 the right to be informed,52 the right to adequate time and 
facilities,53 the right from undue delay54 and the right against self-
incrimination (given that the accused had testified on his own behalf 
prior to the re-characterization).55For each fair trial right, the Court is 
largely dismissive of concerns and attempts to back up its arguments 
with human rights case law.56 
For instance, without the decision to apply Regulation 55, 
Katanga would have arguably received his final judgment on  
December 18, 2012, and he would likely have been acquitted. Instead, 
his final judgment was handed down in March 2014 and he was 
convicted. This long delay, during which he remained in detention, 
was directly linked to Trial Chamber’s decision to apply Regulation 
                                                          
48. Kevin Jon Heller, Quote of the Day – Katanga Dissent, OPINIO JURIS (May 22, 2014, 
7:20 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/05/22/quote-day-katanga-dissent/ [https://perma.cc/
AP7V-LU66] (archived Feb. 28, 2018).  
49. Katanga and Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA, ¶ 12; see also 
Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3363, ¶¶ 73-87, 104.  
50. See generally Katanga and Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA. 
51. Id. at ¶¶ 19-20. 
52. Id. at ¶¶ 21-34. 
53. Id. at ¶¶ 35-42. 
54. Id. at ¶¶ 43-46. 
55. Id. at ¶¶ 47-52. 
56. See supra notes 51-55. 
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55, yet, the majority easily concluded that the late application of the 
re-characterization and the right to a trial without undue delay was not 
violated.57 In order to show that their interpretation was not 
inconsistent with human rights norms the majority referenced case 
law from regional human rights courts, namely the ECHR where they 
argued that similar provisions were enacted in a late stage of trial, 
namely the deliberation stage of the first-instance bench.58 Judge Van 
den Wyngaert aptly points out, however, that the majority uncritically 
transplants the jurisprudence from one domain to the other without 
taking into account the differences of both, which unnecessarily 
conflates the two domains.59 She rightly highlights that the majority 
failed to acknowledge the differences from the context of the 
European Court cases relied upon by the majority with how the 
Katanga case had been conducted, including the extended length of 
the trial.60 For example, one of the main cases relied upon to justify 
the late application of the Regulation is that of Pélissier and Sassi v. 
France.61 Though the majority recognizes that this case was “distinct 
in nature” it nevertheless wholly adopts the reasoning without 
detailing the differences of that distinct nature.62 
With regard to the right to be tried by an independent and 
impartial tribunal, the majority does little more than recognize the 
concern and then dismiss it. This fair trial principle implies that the 
judges must be seen to be independent and impartial and while they 
may exercise a truth-seeking role, they should be reluctant to play too 
great a role in shaping the case. In this situation, the majority arguably 
overstepped their role by formulating a new mode of liability so late 
into the process; a mode of liability that arguably ensured the 
conviction of the accused.63 The ambivalence of the majority towards  
relevant principles and fair trial rights in order to secure a conviction 
indicates how a system that strives to be a model of liberal criminal 
                                                          
57. Katanga and Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA, ¶ 46. 
58. Id. ¶ 18. 
59. Katanga and Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA, ¶ 32 
(Wyngaert, J., dissenting). 
60. Id. at ¶ 96 (Wyngaert, J., dissenting).   
61. Pélissier and Sassi v. France, 30 Eur. H. R. Rep. 715 (1999). 
62. Id. In fact, Pélissier is a case about criminal bankruptcy by the forging of 
commercial documents and fraud. The final sentence imposed was a suspended sentence of 
eighteen months and a fine of FRF30,000, the then equivalent of approximately US$5,500. 
63. Dov Jacobs, A Shifting Scale of Power: Who is in Charge of the Charges at the 
International Criminal Court and the Uses of Regulation 18 (Grotius Centre for Int’l Legal 
Stud., Working Paper 2013/004-ICL, 2011).  
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justice has embraced illiberal and contradictory doctrines.64 It affirms 
what Amann refers to as the impartiality deficit of international 
criminal institutions.65 The impartiality deficit has to do with an 
international criminal court’s compulsion to convict and downplay the 
rights of the accused so as to fulfill its mandate of ending impunity 
and providing justice to victims.66 The following section addresses 
how, in addition to this substantive issue, the conflation of the two 
fields of law has manifested itself in the most adjudicated procedural 
issue to arise at the Court: the issue of victim participation. 
2. Victim Participation 
In response to the harms suffered by victims of crimes falling 
under the Court’s jurisdiction, the ICC became the first international 
criminal tribunal to endorse victim participation in its proceedings.67 
The Rome Statute, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (the “Rules”) 
and Regulations of the Court,68 provide victims with the right to 
participate, other than as witnesses, in Court proceedings providing 
their participation is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights 
of an accused and a fair and impartial trial.69 The procedural rights 
afforded to victims have been heralded and praised by many 
commentators.70 However, the Judges continue to struggle to find the 
                                                          
64. See generally Robinson, supra note 6. 
65. See generally Diane M. Amann, Impartiality Deficit and International Criminal 
Judging, in ATROCITIES AND INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY:  BEYOND TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE 208, 209-11 (Edel Hughes et al., eds., 2007). 
66. BRIANNE MCGONIGLE LEYH, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE? VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 348 (Intersentia 2011). 
67. Id. at 225-331.  
68. Although the Statute and Rules were largely drafted by state representatives, the 
Regulations of the Court were drafted by the Judges and adopted at the 5th Plenary Session on 
May 26, 2004. See Regulations of the Court, ICC-BD/01-01-04 (Fifth Plenary Session May 
17-28, 2004). 
69. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 68, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90.   
70. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some 
Preliminary Reflections, 10 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 144, 167-68 (1999); Silvia. A. Fernández de 
Gurmendi, Definition of Victims and General Principles, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT:  ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 427, 427 (Roy S. 
Lee et al. eds., 2001); Claude Jorda & Jérŏme de Hemptinne, The Status and Role of the 
Victims, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:  A COMMENTARY 
1387, 1390 (Antonio Cassese, et al. eds., 2002); Emily Haslam, Victim Participation at the 
International Criminal Court: A Triumph of Hope Over Experience?, in THE PERMANENT 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:  LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 315, 315 (Dominic 
McGoldrick et al. eds., 2004). 
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most appropriate way to afford victims participatory rights in the 
proceedings without affecting the Court’s primary goals of 
investigation, prosecution and punishment as well as without 
adversely affecting the rights of the accused.71 Thus, although the 
victim participation scheme was a well-intentioned attempt to address 
perceived shortcomings from previous international tribunals, its 
application has, at times, challenged the liberal foundations of the 
criminal process.72 The most important provision providing for 
participation is Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute, which provides:73 
Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court 
shall permit their views and concerns to be presented and 
considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be 
appropriate by the Court and in a manner which is not prejudicial 
to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and 
impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by the 
legal representatives of the victims where the Court considers it 
appropriate, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (RPE).74 (Emphasis added).   
Article 68(3) reproduces text found in Article 6(b) of the Declaration 
of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power.75 As often happens when language is adopted from General 
Assembly declarations not meant for direct application, it is 
inherently vague.76 As a result of this vagueness, the Rules provide 
for a number of more specific participatory rights, such as the right to 
choose a legal representative.77 The Rules also state that legal 
                                                          
71. See Leyh, supra note 66. 
72. Id. at 127-128. 
73. David Donat-Cattin, Article 68, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:  OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 1275 (Otto 
Triffterer, eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
74. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 68, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90.  
75.  Article 6(b) of the Victims’ Declaration reads: “The responsiveness of judicial and 
administrative processes to the needs of victims should be facilitated by: Allowing the views 
and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at appropriate stages of the 
proceedings where their personal interests are affected, without prejudice to the accused and 
consistent with the relevant national criminal justice system.” Declaration of Basic Principles 
of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, Access to justice and 
fair treatment, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/34/Access to justice and fair treatment (Nov. 29, 1985). 
76. Brianne McGonigle-Leyh, Victim-Oriented Measures at International Criminal 
Institutions: Participation and its Pitfalls, 12 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 375, 404 (2012). 
77. ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 90, ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1 (Sep. 3-10, 
2002). 
714 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:697 
representatives may attend and participate in proceedings unless the 
relevant Chamber believes their interventions should be confined to 
written observations; they may be permitted to make opening and 
closing statements,78 present their views and concerns;79 make 
representations in writing to the Pre-Trial Chamber concerning a 
request for the authorisation of an investigation;80 submit 
observations concerning challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court or 
the admissibility of a case;81 request protective measures;82 and apply 
to the Court to question witnesses.83 Their ability to participate is 
directly related to their right to be informed about proceedings and 
developments in a case pursuant to Rule 92.84 In order to ensure the 
fairness of proceedings, the prosecution and the defence have the 
opportunity to reply to any oral or written observation submitted by 
victims.85 
The substance and scope of many participatory rights are not 
explicitly provided for in the governing documents.86 Accordingly, 
the various Chambers each have a wide discretion to decide upon the 
proper modalities of participation.87 This has not been an easy task. 
To be sure, “[n]o single legal issue […] has garnered as much 
attention as the manner in which the ICC judges have interpreted the 
right of victims to participate in [the] proceedings.”88 This Article is 
not able to address all of the decisions and issues related to victim 
participation. However, there are two decisions, one from the Pre-
                                                          
78. Id. Rule 89, ¶ 1. 
79. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 68, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90; Id. at Rule 89. 
80.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 15, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90; ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 50, ¶ 3, ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1 
(Sep. 3-10, 2002). 
81.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 19, ¶ 3, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. 
82.  Id. art. 68, ¶ 1 & art. 88, ¶ 1. 
83.  ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 91, ¶ 3, ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1 (Sep. 
3-10, 2002). 
84.   Id. Rule 92, ¶ 5. 
85.  Id. Rule 91, ¶ 2. 
86.  See generally Court’s Revised Strategy in Relation to Victims, Assembly of State 
Parties, 11th Session, ICC-ASP/11/38 (Nov. 5, 2012). 
87.  ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 89, ¶ 1, ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1 (Sep. 
3-10, 2002) (“[T]he Chamber shall . . . specify the proceedings and manner in which 
participation is considered appropriate. . . .”). 
88.  Christine H. Chung, Victims’ Participation at the International Criminal Court: Are 
Concessions of the Court Clouding the Promise?, 6 NW. J. OF INT’L HUM. RTS. 459, 459 
(2008). 
2018] HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 715 
Trial and one from the Trial stage, that stand out due to their reliance 
on human rights standards to support an expansive interpretation of 
participatory rights for victims before the ICC. 
Relying on human rights law notions, the Single Pre-Trial Judge 
in Katanga and Ngudjolo adopted a broad interpretation of Article 
68(3). Judge Sylvia Steiner found that victims have a core interest in 
the determination of the facts, the identification of those responsible, 
and the declaration of their responsibility.89 She found that these 
interests are found to be at the root of a well-established right to truth, 
which is a right derived from the right to a remedy in human rights 
law.90 And, when the right to truth is satisfied through criminal 
proceedings victims have a general interest in the outcome of the 
proceedings because such proceedings bring clarity about what 
happened and “close possible gaps between the factual findings 
resulting from the criminal proceedings and the actual truth.”91 The 
issue of guilt or innocence, the Single Judge found, is inherently 
linked to the right to truth and that the search for truth can only be 
satisfied if those responsible are declared guilty and those not 
responsible are acquitted so that the search for those who are 
criminally liable can continue.92 Moreover, she found that the 
interests of victims go beyond the determination of what happened 
and the identification of those responsible. The interests of victims 
extend to securing a certain degree of punishment for those found 
criminally responsible.93 Thus, identification, prosecution and 
punishment are all “at the root” of the right to justice for victims of 
serious violations of human rights and are independent from an 
interest in reparation.94 Judge Steiner therefore concluded that victims 
                                                          
89.  Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-474, Decision on the Set of 
Procedural Rules Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, ¶ 
32 (May 13, 2008). 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. ¶ 34. 
92.  Id. ¶¶ 35-36. 
93.  Id. ¶ 38. 
94.  Id. ¶ 39; see also Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-252, Decision on 
Victims’ Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to 
a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, ¶¶ 9-11 (Aug. 10, 2007). Similar to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in Katanga, the Pre-Trial Chamber in Abu Garda found that the personal interests of 
victims may include (i) the right to truth, i.e., the desire to have a declaration of truth by a 
competent body; (ii) the right to justice, i.e., their desire to identify, prosecute and punish those 
responsible for their harm; and (iii) the right to reparation. See Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Case 
No. ICC-02/05-02/09-121, Decision on the 34 Applications for Participation at the Pre-Trial 
Stage of the Case, ¶ 3 (Sept. 25, 2009). 
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have a personal interest in the outcome of the pre-trial stage of a case 
which determines whether there is sufficient evidence providing 
substantial grounds to believe that the suspect(s) are responsible for 
the crimes charged.95 
As a result, when carrying out an Article 68(3) determination, 
the Single Judge concluded that those individuals who meet the 
criteria of Rule 85 (defining who qualifies as a victim) and who are 
granted victim status in the case will always have a personal interest 
in participating in all pre-trial proceedings.96 In other words, the 
determinations of whether a victim’s personal interests are affected 
were carried out, in the broadest of terms, with respect to all victims 
collectively rather than on an individual basis. Furthermore, she found 
that this assessment should be carried out in relation to all pre-trial 
proceedings rather than in relation to specific proceedings arising 
during the pre-trial stage or specific pieces of evidence.97 
This broad approach has also been followed in the Bemba pre-
trial stage,98 and, to some extent, acknowledged in the Katanga and 
Ngudjolo trial stage.99 The benefit of such an approach is that it 
relieves the Judges from making individual assessments throughout 
the proceedings. The drawback of this approach is that it essentially 
invalidates the personal interest precondition found in Article 68(3) 
and makes their interests paramount to other considerations. Later 
Chambers have further streamlined the process, allowing the Registry 
or legal representatives for victims to vet individuals wanting victim 
status rather than judges when they do not wish to speak directly in 
proceedings.100 Kendall and Nouwen argue this streamlining, based 
initially on human rights norms, was done for practical purposes.101 
                                                          
95.  Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-474, ¶ 43. 
96. Id. ¶ 41-44. 
97. Id. ¶ 45. 
98. See generally Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-320, Fourth Decision 
on Victims’ Participation (Dec. 12, 2008). 
99. See generally Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG, 
Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial (Jan. 22, 2010). 
100. See generally Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11-498, Decision on 
Victims’ Representation and Participation (Oct. 3, 2012); see also Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case 
No. ICC-01/09-01/11-460 (Oct. 3, 2012); see also Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-
01/04-02/06-449, Decision on Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings (Feb. 6, 2015). 
101. Sara Kendall & Sarah Nouwen, Representational Practices at the International 
Criminal Court: The Gap between Juridified and Abstract Victimhood, 76 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 235, 249, n.59 (2013). 
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As with pre-trial proceedings, judges during trial proceedings 
have also broadly interpreted statutory provisions to the benefit of 
victim participants, which are, at times, detrimental to the accused. At 
trial, questions surrounding the proper role of victims and the scope of 
their participation arose early on in the Lubanga case.102 More 
specifically, the issue of whether victims would be permitted to lead 
and challenge evidence on the guilt of the accused at trial similar to 
the prosecution was particularly contentious.103 This issue was 
especially delicate given that the drafting papers of the Rome Statue 
indicate that no agreement could be reached by the drafters on the 
matter and the Statute only acknowledges the rights of the parties, and 
not the victim participants, to tender evidence and the Court to request 
evidence.104 Article 69(3) of the Rome Statute, which relates to 
evidence, provides that: “The parties may submit evidence relevant to 
the case, in accordance with article 64. The Court shall have the 
authority to request the submission of all evidence that it considers 
necessary for the determination of the truth.”105 The wording of 
Article 69(3) is significant. The first part seems to implicitly 
recognize the partiality and subjectivity of the adversarial parties in 
that it only requires the presentation of their evidence to be relevant. 
There is no requirement that their evidence assists the Court in 
determining the truth. In contrast, the second part seems to recognize 
the Court as an objective and impartial truth-seeker and implies that 
the evidence it requests will (at least in the Judges’ view) aid in the 
determination of the truth. Undeniably, the inclusion of the second 
part of this provision was to ensure that the Court was not restricted in 
its evaluation of a case to the extent that it could only review evidence 
provided by the parties.106 However, no one foresaw that this second 
part would be used as the means through which victims would 
regularly tender and elicit evidence—often on the guilt of the 
accused. 
                                                          
102. See generally Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision 
on victims’ participation (Jan. 18, 2008).  
103. Id. ¶11-12 & ¶40. 
104. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 69, ¶ 3, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90.  
105. Id. 
106. See Donald K. Piragoff & Hans-Jörg Behrens, Article 69 Evidence, in 
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 889 (Otto 
Triffterer, ed., 1999).  
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When this issue first arose in the Lubanga case, both the 
prosecution and defence argued that victims did not have a right to 
lead and challenge evidence. The defence argued that if the Court 
were to grant victims the same rights as those traditionally reserved 
for the parties, they would be violating the principle of equality of 
arms and prejudicing the rights of the accused by having the defence 
face two accusers.107 Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber held that 
victims did, in fact, have the right to lead and challenge evidence.108  
Although the Chamber noted that the primary responsibility for the 
presentation and challenging of evidence lies with the parties, victims, 
it concluded, should also be able to do so if it assists the Chamber in 
the determination of the truth and if the Court has in some way 
“requested” the evidence.109 A majority of the Appeals Chamber 
agreed.110 Therefore, although Article 66(2) states that the onus is on 
the prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused, the Appeals Chamber 
concluded that Trial Chambers may permit victims to tender and elicit 
evidence if it will assist in the determination of the truth and the Court 
“requests” the evidence in accordance with Article 69(3).111 
Accordingly, Trial Chambers may consider the issue of the guilt of 
the accused as a subject that affects the personal interests of victims 
                                                          
107.  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1220, Defense Appeal 
Against Trial Chamber I’s 18 January 2008 Decision on Victims’ Participation, ¶¶ 51-52 (Mar. 
10, 2008). 
108.  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, Decision on 
Victims’ Participation, ¶ 109 (Jan. 18, 2008). 
109.  Id. ¶ 108.  
110.  Disagreeing with the Appeals Chamber’s Judgment, Judge Pikis dissented, arguing 
instead that according to the Statute and Rules victims can neither adduce evidence on the guilt 
or innocence of the accused nor challenge the admissibility or relevance of evidence. See 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case no. ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, Judgment on the Appeals of 
the Prosecutor and the Defense against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation 
of 18 January 2008, ¶¶ 4-6 (July 11, 2008) (Pikis, J., dissenting in part); Similarly, Judge 
Kirsch, who also dissented from the judgment, and agreed with Judge Pikis on this point, 
referred to Article 69(3), dealing with evidence at trial, to argue that the Statute is 
unambiguous. Article 69(3) clearly states that “the parties may submit evidence relevant to the 
case” and not by any other participant, such as the victims. See id. ¶¶ 21, 35-37. 
111.  Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, ¶ 108; Prosecutor v. Katanga 
and Ngudjolo, Case no. ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG, Decision on the Modalities of Victim 
Participation at Trial, ¶¶ 81-84 (Jan. 22, 2010); Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-
01/08-807-Corr, Corrigendum to Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Trial and on 
86 Applications by Victims to Participate in the Proceedings, ¶¶ 29-37 (July 12, 2010); 
Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-2288, Judgment on the 
Appeal of Mr. Katanga against the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 22 January 2010 Entitled 
“Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial,” ¶¶ 37-40 (July 16, 2010); see 
also Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, ¶ 94. 
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and may authorise legal representatives to question witnesses on the 
issue of guilt.112 
Chambers have approached this idea that victims’ evidence is 
related to the broader purpose of the Court to determine the truth in 
dramatically different ways. The Lubanga and Bemba Trial 
Chambers, for example, have viewed the scope of participation 
broadly. In this sense they regularly allowed victims’ legal 
representatives to question witnesses on the guilt of the accused, 
linking this right with helping the Court to determine the truth.113 
When questioning prosecution witnesses, legal representatives for 
victims have not had to confine their questions to the context of 
crimes, the harm suffered by their clients or reparation issues. Instead, 
legal representatives often attempted to establish the guilt of the 
accused, similar to the attempts of the prosecution.114 Legal 
representatives of victims in Lubanga questioned a number of 
witnesses about the funding of the UPC in an attempt to link Lubanga 
to such financial support in order to help establish his role in the UPC 
leadership structure.115 In another instance, the legal representatives 
of the victims asked questions of a witness, who worked with the 
child protection unit of United Nations Mission for the Stabilization 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), about specific 
contact she had with the accused and his knowledge of the use of 
child soldiers in an attempt to establish his knowledge of the 
crimes.116 
On the one hand, this approach acknowledges the partiality of 
the victims and their desire, in this case, to have the accused 
convicted. On the other hand, their interventions, unlike those of the 
other parties, are linked with the notion of assisting the Court in 
establishing the truth, which implies some sort of objectivity. 
Moreover, this approach essentially allows for multiple accusers in 
                                                          
112. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2127, Decision on the 
Manner of Questioning Witnesses by the Legal Representatives of Victims, ¶ 25 (September 
16, 2009); see also Katanga and Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-2288, ¶ 48.  
113.  Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2127, ¶ 27.  
114.  It was not necessary for the prosecution to show that Lubanga enlisted and 
recruited child soldiers himself. Rather, he was found criminally responsible for being part of a 
group that did. In other words, the prosecution needed to show that Lubanga was part of a 
group of persons that had a “common plan.” 
115.  Transcript, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo (Feb. 12, 2009), at 73; Transcript, 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo (Mar. 24, 2009), at 83-88; Transcript, Prosecutor v. Lubanga 
Dyilo (May 62009), 8-9; Transcript, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo (July 2, 2009), at 2. 
116.  Transcript, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo (July 9, 2009), at 24-25.  
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the courtroom. Defence teams must be prepared to be confronted with 
accusations not only from the prosecution but also from victims and, 
to an extent, judges. Chung argues that the mere fact that the defence 
teams must prepare to meet additional evidence risks prejudicing their 
rights.117 The effect of multiple accusers against an accused impacts 
not only on the time and resources of defence counsel in having to 
respond to multiple arguments but also could relieve part of the 
burden of proof from the prosecution. There is a difference in the 
judges exercising their power at the behest of victims versus 
requesting certain evidence at their own initiative. When done 
repeatedly at the victims’ request, judges can be seen as less 
objective. Zappalà asks whether it is desirable for the prosecution’s 
burden of proof to be shared by the prosecution, the victims and the 
judges collectively.118 It is certainly more difficult for the defence to 
challenge evidence requested by the judges, who would undoubtedly 
argue they are requesting the evidence as an impartial tribunal even 
when on behalf of victims, than to challenge evidence requested by 
the prosecution. 
In both the Pre-Trial and Trial Chamber decisions on victim 
participation discussed above, the judges have sought to expand the 
participatory rights of victims by relying on an arguably 
indeterminate human rights concept not found in the Statute, the right 
to truth.119 One of the major problems in international criminal law is 
that judges relying upon the right to truth are doing so in such an 
expansive manner. Expansive uses refer to the broad references to the 
right to truth where they are not connected to any context, legal 
doctrine or specific relationship between the victim and accused.120 
These examples highlight situations where judges are less willing to 
emphasize liberal values focused on the defendant (and his rights) to a 
more victim-oriented focus. Such a shift has already occurred within 
the human rights system (most notably in the Inter-American system), 
                                                          
117.  Chung, supra note 88, at 519, n.242. 
118.  Salvatore Zappalá, The Rights of Victims v. the Rights of the Accused, 8 J. OF 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 137, 148 (2010).  
119.  See Brianne McGonigle Leyh, The Right to Truth in International Criminal 
Proceedings: An Indeterminate Concept from Human Rights Law, in THE REALISATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS: WHEN THEORY MEETS PRACTICE 293 (Yves Haeck et al., eds., Intersentia 
2013). 
120. J. Benton Heath, Human Dignity at Trial: Hard Cases and Broad Concepts in 
International Criminal Law, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L. L. REV. 317, 323 (2012). 
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which, as set out above, has different focuses and purposes than the 
ICC.121 
Looked at in isolation the various restraining principles and fair 
trial rights affected by participation may not seem problematic, but it 
is the combined effect of the edging away of these rights and values 
that matters most. The edging away of liberal criminal law values is 
alarming not least of which because international courts have already 
witnessed the relaxing of procedural and evidentiary rules that 
negatively affect the rights of an accused. However, despite the de-
emphasis on liberal values, there are a handful of instances where the 
judges draw clear boundaries between international criminal law and 
human rights law, suggesting a reluctance, at least in some instances, 
by the Court to take on a more human rights-related role in general. 
B. Reluctance by the Court to take on a More Human-Rights Related 
Role 
Though the Court is mindful of the importance that human rights 
play in criminal proceedings more generally there have been some 
important instances where it has been reluctant to embrace an overtly 
human rights approach. Interestingly, in these instances, this 
reluctance is generally not to the benefit of the accused or individual 
(who is not a victim) requesting greater human rights considerations. 
The following section will address three instances where the Court 
has made clear the distinction between its role and the role of a 
human rights court or mechanism. Importantly, these examples are 
less directly related to the criminal charges of a specific individual. 
The first concerns the situation in Libya and the Court’s attempts to 
exert its jurisdiction. The second example concerns the situation in 
the Katanga and Ngudjolo case when witnesses requested asylum in 
the Netherlands, and the third example deals with the reparations 
decision by the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga. 
1. The Libya example 
On February 26, 2011 the UN Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1970 unanimously referring the situation in Libya to the 
                                                          
121. See Lucas Lixinski, Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights: Expansionism at the Service of Unity of International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 585 
(2010). 
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ICC.122 Libya is not a party to the Rome Statute,123 but the UN 
Security Council referral allows the Court to exercise jurisdiction.124 
In March of 2011, then ICC Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, 
opened an official investigation and soon afterwards announced that 
his office identified widespread evidence of crimes against humanity 
and war crimes.125 The Prosecutor speedily sought and was granted 
approval for arrest warrants for Libya’s former leader Muammar 
Gaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam, and intelligence chief Abdullah 
Senussi. It was later learned that Muammar Gaddafi died while in the 
custody of rebel fighters, leaving only his son, Saif al-Islam, and 
Senussi left to face charges before the ICC.126 Libyans, however, felt 
that these men should be tried in Libya by Libyans, which resulted in 
the new Libyan government requesting permission to try the men 
domestically.127 
Importantly, as mentioned above, the ICC is not designed to 
replace national prosecutions. Rather, under the principle of 
complementarity, it is intended to supplement or compliment national 
jurisdictions. As such, the principle of complementarity rests on the 
notion that national jurisdictions have the primary responsibility for 
investigating and prosecuting serious crimes.128 This primacy is 
largely based on practical and pragmatic considerations since States 
will often have better access to evidence and witnesses. Article 17 of 
the Rome Statute deals with admissibility and provides that a case 
will be inadmissible if a State is investigating or prosecuting the case 
or has already done so, unless the State is unwilling or unable to 
                                                          
122. S.C. Res. 1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).  
123. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC Official Website, https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome
%20statute.aspx [https://perma.cc/UR4C-6HSB] (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).  
124. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 13, ¶ b, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
125.  See ICC Prosecutor to Open an Investigation in Libya, RELIEFWEB (Mar. 2, 2011), 
//reliefweb.int/report/libya/icc-prosecutor-open-investigation-libya [https://perma.cc/9AHB-
F65Q] (archived Mar. 1, 2018).  
126.  Situation in Libya ICC-01/11, ICC Official Website, https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya 
[https://perma.cc/4E25-46HU] (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
127. See generally Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi, ICC-
01/11-01/11-130-Red, Application on Behalf of the Government of Libya pursuant to Article 
19 of the ICC Statute (May 1, 2012). 
128. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Preamble, art. 1, art 17, ¶ 1(a), 
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.  
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genuinely carry out proceedings.129 Through its jurisprudence, the 
Court has further found that the national proceedings must encompass 
both the same person and conduct which are at issue before the 
Court.130 The “unwilling” element of Article 17 is largely subjective 
and requires the Court to look at the motives of the State and whether 
it is trying to shield the suspect from criminal prosecution. The Court 
must assess whether the national proceedings are being conducted 
independently or impartially or in a manner inconsistent with an 
intent to bring the person concerned to justice. The “inability” 
element of Article 17 is objective and provides, in part, that the State 
must be able to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence to carry 
out its proceedings.131 
In the case of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
concluded, and the Appeals Chamber agreed, that the Court had not 
been provided with enough evidence to demonstrate that the Libyan 
and the ICC investigations covered the same conduct and that Libya 
was able to genuinely carry out an investigation against Gaddafi.132 
Specifically, the Court noted that Libya was unable to carry out 
proceedings because it had not been able to provide Gaddafi with 
defense counsel despite the fact that Libyan law guaranteed him 
one.133 In focusing on this point, the Court stressed that Libya was 
unable to carry out proceedings against Gaddafi in compliance with 
its national laws, namely the 2011 Libyan Constitutional Declaration, 
ignoring international due process standards when assessing 
admissibility under the Statute.134  While unsuccessful with 
                                                          
129. Id. art. 17 (“The Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: [t]he case 
is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”). 
130. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2-US, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 31 (Feb. 10, 2006). 
131. See generally Sharon A. Willians & William A. Schabas, Article 17 Issues of 
Admissibility, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
COMMENTARY (2nd ed., 2008).  
132.  See generally Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi, ICC-
01/11-01/11-344-Red, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case against Saif al-Islam Gaddafi 
(May 31, 2013); Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-
01/11-387, Decision on the Request for Suspensive Effect and Related Issues, Appeals 
Chamber, ¶¶ 135, 205 (July 18, 2013).  
133.  Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-387, ¶¶ 212-14. 
134. See The Principle of Complementarity in Practice, (ICC-OTP, Informal Expert 
Paper No. ICC-01/04-01/07-1008-AnxA, Mar. 30, 2009); cf. Kevin Jon Heller, The Shadow 
Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on National Due 
Process, 17 CRIM. L. FORUM 255 (2006). 
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regard to Saif al-Gaddafi, Libya was successful in arguing that it 
could prosecute Sanussi domestically,135 which his defence team 
appealed based in part on the fact that his basic due process rights, 
under international human rights standards, were not being met. 
Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber upheld the earlier decision, which 
again focused on domestic standards.136 To counter defence 
arguments that the Court should look into whether Libya was meeting 
international human rights (fair trial) standards, the Appeals Chamber 
went so far as to state, “Indeed, the Court was not established to be an 
international court of human rights, sitting in judgment over domestic 
legal systems to ensure that they are compliant with international 
standards of human rights".”137 This statement is telling of the 
distinction the Court was willing to make in this situation between its 
role and that of a human rights body. 
Through its case law, the Court has indicated that international 
fair trial considerations are not the focus of Article 17 
determinations.138 This is despite the fact that international human 
rights standards are specifically mentioned in Article 21(3) and 
“[h]uman rights underpin the Statute; every aspect of it.”139 This 
reluctant approach has allowed the Court to provide greater leeway to 
the domestic system and focus on its role as an anti-impunity 
mechanism rather than a human rights court reviewing a State’s 
domestic practices. In this regard, the Court seems to suggest that it is 
important to give domestic judiciaries an opportunity, at least until it 
becomes patently clear that violations of due process, rather than just 
being worrying in themselves, call into question the very ability to 
prosecute an accused.140 Yet, if Libya did not meet that standard it is 
hard to imagine what would. In the end, Libya never transferred 
Gaddafi to the Court in The Hague. Instead, it carried on with its 
                                                          
135. See generally Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC-
01/11-01/11-466-Red, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case against Abdullah Al-Senussi 
(Oct. 11, 2013). 
136. Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-
565, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Abdullah Al-Senussi against the Decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber I of 11 October 2013 entitled, “Decision on the admissibility of the case against 
Abdullah Al-Senussi” (May 24, 2014). 
137. Id. ¶ 219. 
138. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-565, n.495. 
139. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-772, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr 
Thomas Lubanga Dylo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of 
the Court pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, ¶ 37 (Dec. 14, 2006). 
140. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-565, ¶¶ 1-3. 
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questionable domestic proceedings against both men, and ultimately 
both were later sentenced to death.141 One year later, however, in the 
summer of 2016, it was reported in the media that the government 
quashed his sentence,142 and in 2017 he was released by the Zintan 
militia.143 
2. Katanga Witnesses Example 
The second example of reluctance to adopt an outright human 
rights approach concerns a situation that arose with witnesses in the 
Katanga and Ngudjolo case. Following an agreement between the 
ICC and the DRC, in March 2011, Floribert Njabu, Pierre Celèstin 
Mbodina Iribi and Sharif Manda Ndadza, three witnesses in the case, 
were transferred from the DRC to the ICC to testify.144 The three 
witnesses were held at the ICC Detention Center because prior to 
giving testimony in The Hague the three men had been in detention 
(for over six years) in the DRC for their alleged role in the murder of 
UN peacekeepers.145 However, DRC officials never brought charges 
against them in this regard.146 
While in the custody of the ICC, on May 12, 2011 the witnesses 
requested asylum in the Netherlands, arguing they would face 
persecution and safety risks, torture, ill treatment or even death if they 
were sent back to prison in the DRC because they implicated the 
current President of the DRC, Joseph Kabila, with their 
                                                          
141. Gaddafi’s Son Saif al-Islam Sentenced to Death, AL JAZEERA (July 28, 2015), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/gaddafi-son-saif-al-islam-libya-sentenced-death-
150728084429303.html [https://perma.cc/6HN5-BBND] (archived Mar. 1, 2018). 
142.  Chris Stephen, Gaddafi son Saif al-Islam “freed after death sentence quashed,” 
THE GUARDIAN (July 7, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/07/gaddafi-son-
saif-al-islam-freed-after-death-sentence-quashed [https://perma.cc/BBF2-F79B] (archived 
Mar. 1, 2018). 
143.  Chris Stephen, Gaddafi son Saif al-Islam freed by Libyan militia, THE GUARDIAN, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/11/gaddafi-son-saif-al-islam-freed-by-libyan-
militia [https://perma.cc/T2V9-YKQY] (archived Mar. 20, 2018). 
144.  Transfer of Detained Witnesses, ICC Standard Operating Procedure [Transfèrement 
des Témoins Détenus, Procédure de Fonctionnement Standard], ICC-01/04-01/06-2732-Conf-
Exp-Anxl (May 9, 2011).  
145.  Netherlands: Do not return ICC witnesses at risk of death penalty, ill-treatment 
and unfair trials to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (June 
30, 2014), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/EUR35/001/2014/es/ [https://perma.cc/
5WMM-X39Q] (archived Mar. 20, 2018). 
146. Id. 
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testimonies.147 On June 9, 2011, the Trial Chamber issued a decision 
to delay the witnesses’ return to the DRC in compliance with Article 
93(7)(b) of the Rome Statute,148 holding that a return would violate, 
according to Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute, the Court’s 
obligations to protect witnesses, the witnesses’ human right to apply 
for asylum, the non-refoulement principle, and the right to an 
effective remedy.149 Importantly, in the Court’s view, however, the 
Statute only requires the Court to protect witnesses from risks related 
to their cooperation with the ICC. It does not imply a broader duty to 
protect witnesses from the risk of persecution they may suffer once 
they return home.150 
More specifically, the Trial Chamber found that the Court does 
not have to apply the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits 
the expulsion of refugees to places where their lives could be in 
danger.151 The Court emphasized that Article 21(3) “only requires the 
Chambers to ensure that the Statute and other sources of law set forth 
in Article 21(1) and 21(2) are applied in a manner which is not 
inconsistent with or in violation of internationally recognised human 
rights.”152 As such, the Court held that it must enable the witnesses to 
exercise their right to seek asylum by, for example, allowing the 
witnesses to meet and correspond with their lawyers of choice so that 
they can access asylum procedures.153 For this purpose, it delayed the 
return of the witnesses to the DRC but was reluctant to take on a 
bigger role by accepting responsibility for their legal protection. 
Initially, the Dutch authorities were critical of the actions of the 
ICC, which essentially required the Dutch government to process the 
asylum requests of the three witnesses. The Dutch authorities 
                                                          
147.  See generally Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-2968, Request for Leave to 
Submit Amicus Curiae Observations by Mr. Shuller and Mr. Sluiter, Council in Dutch Asylum 
Proceedings of Witnesses DRC-D02-P-0236, DRC-D02-P-0228, DRC-D02-P-0350, Counsel 
for Witnesses (May 25, 2011). 
148.   Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 93, ¶ 7(b), July 17, 1998, 
2187 (“A person thus transferred shall remain in custody and once the purposes of the transfer 
have been fulfilled, the Court shall return the person without delay to the requested State.”). 
149.  Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3003-tENG, Decision on 
an Amicus Curiae Application and on the ‘Requête tendant à obtenir présentations des témoins 
DRC-D02-P-0350, DRC-D02-P-0236, DRC-D02-P-0228 aux autorités néerlandaises aux fins 
d’asile’, ¶35 (June 9, 2011). 
150.  Id. ¶¶ 59-63.  
151.  In this sense, the ICC’s evaluation differs from the evaluation a State should make 
in response to an asylum application. See id. ¶ 63. 
152.  Id. ¶ 62. 
153.  Id. ¶ 73. 
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continuously sought to exempt the witnesses from the Dutch asylum 
procedures, arguing, amongst other things, that the witnesses’ 
applications should be considered mere “requests for protection” over 
which the Dutch Alien Act (Vreemdelingenwet) did not apply.154 
Instead, they sought to evaluate the witnesses’ requests on the basis of 
a sui generis procedure whereby they would only determine whether 
the non-refoulement principle obstructs the Netherlands from 
excluding the witnesses from asylum.155 However, in its decision of 
December 28, 2011, the District Court of The Hague prevented the 
Dutch authorities from pursuing this approach and determined that 
neither Dutch immigration law nor the regulations concerning the 
relations between the Netherlands and the ICC exempt the witnesses 
from the regular asylum procedure.156 Meanwhile, the Congolese 
authorities were insisting on the return of the witnesses to the DRC 
upon completion of their testimony.157 As a result, the Court found 
the situation problematic from a state cooperation standpoint. 
In October 2012, the asylum applications of the witnesses were 
denied by decisions from the Dutch Minister for Immigration, 
Integration and Asylum under the application of Article 1(f) of the 
Refugee Convention.158 This provision provides that refugee status 
cannot be granted when there are “serious reasons for considering” 
that the applicant committed war crimes or crimes against humanity, 
amongst other crimes.159 But the question of whether they could be 
returned, possibly in violation of the principle of non-refoulement was 
still unanswered and the witnesses appealed the denial of asylum. On 
June 4, 2014, after a number of legal pleadings and appeals, as well as 
consultations between all parties involved, the witnesses were 
transferred from the ICC Detention Center to the Dutch authorities. 
At this point, the ICC was satisfied with the assurances provided by 
                                                          
154.  Marjolein Cupido & Joris van Wijk, Testifying Behind Bars: Detained ICC 
witnesses and Human Rights Protection, SSRN (Jan. 4, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2374678 [https://perma.cc/Z5ZC-DLRP] (archived Mar. 1, 2018).  
155.  Id. (citing Rechtbank Den Haag, § 8.2, Dec. 28, 2011). 
156.  Id. (citing Rechtbank Den Haag, § 9.9, Dec. 28, 2011). 
157.  See Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3405-tENG, Decision 
on the Application for the Interim Release of Detained Witnesses DRCD02-P-0236, DRC-
D02-P-0228 and DRC-D02-P-0350, ¶19 (Oct. 1, 2013). 
158.  HR 4 April 2014, NJ 2014, 481 m.nt. (Neth.).  All detainees were in the Detention 
Centre of the International Criminal Court, Scheveningen, municipality of The Hague/The 
State of the Netherlands.  
159. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(F), July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. 
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the DRC to protect them if they would be returned, namely that no 
death penalty would be imposed and that their cases would be added 
to the roster for national proceedings.160 Interestingly, no assurances 
were provided by the DRC to the Netherlands itself.161 On June 27, 
2014, the Dutch Council of State denied the witnesses’ asylum 
application confirming the applicability of the Article 1(f) exception 
of the Refugee Convention. Its decision quashed an earlier 
Amsterdam District Court’s decision from October 2013, stating that 
they could not be sent back, and thus authorized their transfer back to 
the DRC.162 A short time later the witnesses were returned to 
Kinshasa in the DRC.163 
The case presented a number of legal and human rights-related 
questions for the Court to address. One such question is who was 
responsible for the witnesses’ protection upon their return. Following 
the agreement between the DRC and the ICC, the witnesses remained 
under Congolese custody. The DRC repeatedly emphasized this point 
when asking for the return of the witnesses.164 However, in practice, 
the DRC did not have effective control over the witnesses since they 
were not present physically on its territory. The witnesses were 
physically present in the Netherlands and, more specifically, on the 
ICC’s premises. Thus, it could be argued that the ICC was the one 
with effective control over them. However, according to Article 44 of 
the Headquarters Agreement, the competent authorities at the Court’s 
request shall carry out the transport of persons in custody of the 
ICC.165 Since the ICC is not a State, it does not have the means to 
carry on any transfer on its own; it requires the cooperation of the 
                                                          
160. Press Release, ICC, ICC transfers three detained witnesses to Dutch custody (June 
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165.  Headquarters Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the Host 
State, Mar. 1 2008, ICC‐BD/04‐01‐08. 
2018] HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 729 
host State. Therefore, it appeared to be a situation of shared 
responsibility.166 However, throughout the long process, both the 
Netherlands and the ICC tried to excuse themselves from the 
responsibility of assessing the protection concerns raised by the 
witnesses.167 
For its part, the Court found that unlike the Netherlands, which 
is party to the ICCPR and the ECHR, the Court has a more restrictive 
regime to act under. In other words, it does not work under a human 
rights framework as a State would. Evidence of this restrictive 
approach is the Trial Chamber’s decision of August 24, 2011 stating 
that the requirements of Article 68 of the Rome Statute, dealing with 
protection of witnesses, were limited to risks related to the 
cooperation of the witnesses with the ICC.168  Thus, the Trial 
Chamber concluded it could not take any position regarding the 
potential violation of the witnesses’ human rights or alleged 
persecution by the DRC authorities.169 However, this interpretation of 
Article 68 is not so clear cut. 
The International Court of Justice has established in one of its 
advisory opinions that “international organizations are subjects of 
international law, and as such, are bound by any obligations 
incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under 
their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are 
parties.”170 The principle of non-refoulement would arguably apply to 
international organisations such as the ICC. Moreover, Article 57 of 
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility,171 enacted by the 
International Law Commission (“ILC”), recognizes that international 
organisations may be held internationally responsible, further 
supporting the notion that international organisations have a duty to 
respect international obligations such as the principle of non-
refoulement.172 The international responsibility of international 
organisations can also be found in the Draft Articles on the 
                                                          
166.  Göran Sluiter, Shared Responsibility in International Criminal Justice, the ICC and 
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170. Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, 
International Court of Justice (Dec. 20, 1980), at 73.  
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International Law Commission (Supplement No. 10, A/56/10, November 2001). 
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Responsibility of International Organizations (“DARIO”)173 enacted 
by the ILC in 2011. The DARIO acknowledge that every action or 
omission attributable to a certain organisation under international law 
that constitutes a breach of an international obligation entails the 
international responsibility of that organisation.174 While the 
application of the principle of non-refoulement to the ICC is not 
straight forward the Judges shied away from addressing its own 
institutional role. 
In its decision, the Appeals Chamber did not take into account 
the fact that the obligation underlying the non-refoulement principle 
is absolute.175 Rather than address the absolute prohibition under 
human rights law, it instead choose to confine itself to its State 
cooperation obligations under Article 93(7). While behind the scenes 
the Court was working to gain protection assurances from the DRC in 
order to secure some human rights for the witnesses, its official 
position maintained that the Statute does not impose on the Court the 
obligation to protect witnesses from human rights violations that do 
not derive from their participation before the Court. Its assessment of 
whether there was a link between the potential risk that the witnesses 
faced upon return and their testimony before the ICC was generally 
narrower than one that might be applied by a human rights body 
considering a question of non-refoulement.176 The existence of a 
context of gross human rights violations in the DRC detention 
centers, their illegal detention prior to their transfer to the ICC and the 
content of their testimony are all important factors that were not given 
much weight by the Court. 
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In this specific case, the witnesses implicated the President of 
the DRC in their testimonies. Such actions arguably made them 
particularly vulnerable to the risk of torture or ill treatment on their 
return. The position of the Appeals Chamber in this situation seems to 
stand in stark contrast to statements in the Lubanga case where it held 
that “human rights underpin the Statute; every aspect of it, including 
the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court. Its provisions must be 
interpreted and more importantly applied in accordance with 
internationally recognised human rights.”177 The internal incoherence 
is striking. The position of the Court in this situation seems to suggest 
that it may only officially be interested in human rights norms that 
affect some individuals, such as victims and accused. Whereas the 
rights of other individuals, such as witnesses, may be of a lower 
priority. This is not to say that the Court had the power or capacity to 
take decisive action. However, as with many human rights bodies, 
this is also the case. Nevertheless, the Court had the opportunity to 
pronounce upon the principle of non-refoulement and its institutional 
role vis-à-vis the individuals, including their testimony and their 
concerns about returning to the DRC. 
3. Reparations Decisions 
The third, and final, example of where the Court has shown 
reluctance to adopt a broader human rights approach has to do with 
the Appeals Chamber judgment on reparations in the Lubanga case. 
On March 3, 2015 the Appeals Chamber handed down its much-
awaited judgment on the appeal against the Lubanga Trial Chamber 
“Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to 
reparations.”178 The Appeals Chamber noted the errors and 
shortcomings of the Trial Chamber’s decision and clarified how Trial 
Chambers should approach reparations decisions in the future. The 
Appeals Chamber refrained from adopting too broad a mandate with 
regard to reparations.179 
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In its Judgment, the Appeals Chamber laid out five general 
elements that all orders for reparations must include: (1) an order for 
reparations must be made against the convicted person; (2) the order 
must establish and inform the convicted person of his or her liability; 
(3) the order must specify the type of reparations that are to be 
awarded, including whether they will be individual, collective or 
both; (4) the order must define the harm caused to direct and indirect 
victims as a result of the crimes for which the person was convicted 
and identify the appropriate modalities of reparations (such as 
restitution, compensation, etc.) based on the circumstances of the 
case; and (5) the order must identify the victims that are eligible to 
benefit from the reparations or set out the criteria for eligibility based 
on the link between the harm suffered by the victims and the crimes 
for which the person was convicted.180 
Unlike the earlier position of the Trial Chamber, the Appeals 
Chamber clarified that “reparation orders are intrinsically linked to 
the individual whose criminal liability is established in a conviction 
and whose culpability for those criminal acts is determined in a 
sentence.”181 As a consequence, the Court held that a convicted 
person’s liability for reparations must be proportionate to the harm 
caused and his or her participation in the commission of the crimes 
for which he/she was found guilty, in the specific circumstances of 
the case.182 The judgment addressed that part of the Trial Chamber 
decision which seemed to open the door to reparation awards for 
victims who suffered from gender and sexual-based violence, crimes 
for which Lubanga had not been convicted of, but which could be 
argued were proximately caused by the crime of the enlistment and 
recruitment of child soldiers, for which Lubanga had been 
convicted.183 
As for the identification of victims eligible to benefit from the 
reparations award, the Appeals Chamber once again stressed that only 
those victims who suffered harm as a result of the commission of 
crimes for which Lubanga was convicted may claim reparations 
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against him.184 As such, when a reparations award is made to the 
benefit of a community, only members of that community who meet 
the relevant criteria are eligible to benefit directly from the reparation 
awarded.185 It held that it is not proper to impose liability on Lubanga 
for reparations for individuals who did not suffer harm (directly or 
indirectly) that did not result from crimes for which he was found 
guilty.186 Therefore, the Appeals Chamber judgment limited the 
number and type of victims that were recognized in the Trial 
Chamber decision.  
The Judgment embraced restraining principles, most notably 
related to personal culpability, and upholds the character of the ICC 
as a criminal court that may issue reparation orders linked with the 
conviction of an accused. It refrains from adopting a broader 
reparations mandate that would be more victim-oriented. Instead, it 
leaves the broader mandate to the Trust Fund for Victims (“TFV”), 
which is arguably better placed to exercise these types of functions 
through its assistance mandate. This approach stands in stark contrast 
to the reparations ordered by the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, for example, which are largely heralded for being progressive 
and inclusive.187 One can see that the Appeals Chamber took note of 
the different approach taken by the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights and the context in which they operate, and decided not to 
follow it.188 
A final decision on reparations has yet to be issued in the 
Lubanga case; yet, the first-ever reparations decision of the ICC came 
out in the Katanga case in March 2017.189 In the Katanga reparations 
decision, the Court follows the restraining principles as laid out by the 
Appeals Chamber in Lubanga. While it makes numerous references to 
Inter-American Court case law to support a finding that damages for 
psychological harm do not have to be proven by victims or their direct 
family members and to support the awarding of both collective and 
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individual reparations,190 it does so within the scope of the Lubanga 
Appeals Chamber Judgment. 
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE ICC? WHERE TO GO FROM HERE? 
Based on the five situations presented above, it seems that the 
ICC, at times, embraces ideological assumptions about human rights 
and the expansive interpretation of the law without considering 
fundamental, restraining principles of criminal law. This certainly 
appeared to be the case in the Katanga Trial Chamber Judgment 
based on Regulation 55 and the approach taken by many Chambers 
regarding broad victim participation rights in proceedings. Here, the 
uncritical assumptions and preferences seemed to discount a number 
of restraining principles and rights, including the principles of 
legality, legal certainty and fair trial considerations. These decisions 
while compliant with human rights law, can be seen to be detrimental 
to an accused in a criminal process. However, the Court also, at times, 
rejects a conflation of the two fields of law and makes clear that its 
role is one of an anti-impunity mechanism and not more. 
The last three examples suggest that despite serious instances 
where the two fields of law conflate to the detriment of an accused, 
the Court has recognized the distinction between its role as a criminal 
court and that of a human rights body. In both the asylum seekers 
example and the Libya example the Court was reluctant to 
substantively or structurally converge the fields of international 
criminal law and human rights law. In this sense, it stuck closely to a 
strict reading of the Statute, though the beneficiaries of this approach 
were certainly not the individuals seeking protection under the human 
rights principle of non-refoulement and international fair trial 
standards respectively. In the reparations judgment the Court 
refrained from adopting a victim-focused teleological reasoning and 
instead stuck closely to principles of culpability and fair labelling. 
Nevertheless, in this situation, it was arguably willing to do so 
because it could rely on the TFV to potentially address the broader 
needs of victims. In these examples, the Court showed great 
reluctance of transplanting concepts from one domain to the other, 
despite doing so in other situations. The situation which emerges from 
this analysis is, unsurprisingly, complex. 
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While the examples set out above differ in context, the last three 
are less directly related to the criminal case against a specific 
individual, one common thread amongst the five examples is the fact 
that the Court seems to adopt or refrain from adopting a greater 
human rights approach when it suits other practical considerations. In 
other words, the Court is pragmatic. When it is useful to adopt a 
progressive approach it does so, like when it helps to secure a 
conviction (and discount alleged fair trial violations) or when it makes 
victim participation assessments easier and more streamlined. When it 
is not practical to adopt a human rights approach, like when state 
cooperation is an issue, such as in the Libya situation or with the 
asylum situation, or when there is another body to address the greater 
needs of victims it will refrain from adopting a greater human rights 
approach. This commonality, however, should not be exaggerated. 
The approach of the Court is largely unclear and inconsistent. While 
the examples addressed in this study highlight some of the more 
prominent situations where human rights issues arose at the ICC, 
more research needs to be done into judicial administration and 
interpretation. 
There is no denying that there is overlap between international 
criminal law and human rights law. The ICC deals with the 
prosecution of individuals accused of serious violations of human 
rights (and international humanitarian law). Moreover, international 
human rights standards are listed as a secondary source of applicable 
law under the Statute. However, since the ICC was never designed to 
operate as a human rights institution but rather as a criminal court, 
obvious tensions ensue. While this distinction is important, what is 
needed is a more comprehensive and transparent approach by the 
judges towards such tensions in the future. To this end, prominent 
academics are calling for the Court to adopt a consistent theory of 
international criminal law that includes a principled interpretation of 
the Rome Statute.191 To move in any other direction would further 
entrench the inconsistent approach adopted thus far. Should a future 
theory of interpretation be developed and adopted, it should reflect a 
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more critical awareness of the reasoning techniques and assumptions 
adopted by previous courts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Whereas in a liberal system a court would be sensitive to the 
importance of the restraints of the use of the State’s coercive power 
against an individual, in international criminal law, prosecution and 
conviction are often viewed as the fulfilment of a victim’s human 
right to a remedy.192 This sort of conceptualization emboldens the use 
of human rights interpretation and application and shifts the focus of 
the system from the individual culpability of an accused to one that is 
more victim-focused on harms generally. If the ICC is in fact a liberal 
criminal law institution, its judges will need to adhere to international 
human rights standards without discounting or diminishing the 
important role played by restraining principles of criminal law. After 
examining a number of prominent instances arising at the Court, it 
appears that the ICC is unclear about the extent of its human rights 
obligations and its desired role in facilitating the interpretation of 
human rights. It is largely driven by pragmatism rather than principle. 
Greater clarity, through a more consistent and transparent theory of 
international criminal law interpretation, is needed. In the meantime, 
the judges should remain reluctant from conflating the two fields of 
law, with the exception of benefiting an accused at trial, because to do 
otherwise can undermine the very principles upon which fair and 
legitimate criminal proceedings operate. 
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